Alasdair Lean

TURKEY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

by Alasdair Lean
http://alasdairlean.com/

At present Turkey's accession to membership of the European Union is being debated. One of the stumbling-blocks is purportedly Turkey's continuing refusal to recognize the Armenian genocide at all, let alone in its true proportions. This, though the Armenians clutch onto it as a winning card, merely confuses the issue. Turkey should not become a member at all, at least for now, and for three or four reasons:

Turkey is not European, but of Central Asian, Mongol provenance (roughly Turkestan), though its present population is admittedly somewhat mixed. It was a policy of the Turks in times past to take the children of the peoples they conquered and raise them as elite Turkish soldiery— janissaries— with which optimal genetic material was incorporated in their bloodstock at the same time. From this we may gather that the Turks are not really racists— in contrast with the NS Germans— though most definitely eugenicists. Is there a difference? Of course there is: the Turks destroyed their Armenians not because they despised them but because they feared them. But really the racial aspect is irrelevant, since Europeans themselves are a pretty mixed bunch, particularly nowadays.

The Turks are migrants from the East. In this sense they are like other invaders, e.g. Tartars, Huns, Cossacks, with the difference that the last-mentioned, though temporarily successful in overruning European territories, were eventually assimilated into the local populations. The Turks came as conquerors and imposed their own mores on some of the peoples they subjugated, as in the Balkans.

Were their values and traditions worth imposing, worth accepting? This is questionable: for the most part the Turks seem to have been rejected and, when it became practicable, ejected (besides the Middle East and North Africa, from Poland, Hungary, Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Rumania, Albania, Macedonia, Bulgaria and, most significantly, Greece— to say nothing of Austria). They are still in Cyprus.

A second reason is a "religious" one. They are not "Christians," whatever that may mean. This is not to imply that the majority of Europeans and Euro-Americans are, in any meaningful sense of the word. Yet there is a deeply ingrained and ancient tradition, which has withstood innumerable onslaughts, and this has come to constitute the underlying feeling and philosophy of the average European, whether he attends church or not, whether he is even a believer or not. Christianity, as any other popular, widespread religious mold, is more a culture, a view of life, than an actual set of metaphysical beliefs; and as such it has shaped the European mentality in no small way. In its traditional form it was, of course, anything but democratic, either in its Catholic, Protestant, or Orthodox variants, all of them unashamedly based on power politics, with a pyramidal power structure as their model. In fact, liberation from this pattern has occurred even later than in the political, civil sense: it is only in the 20th century that there has been a consistent movement away from religion, so as to make room for the play of individual conscience— Protestantism taken to its ultimate consequences— rather than the imposition of rigid rules from without. (Let us just remember the cutty stool, also known as Stool of Repentance, in Scottish churches, on which they made to sit during sevices, in view of the tut-tutting, head-shaking congregation, any person caught "fornicating," or performing other untoward acts, according to the interpretation of the concept by the powers that were; or the church's dour dominance of general life which still prevails to a fair extent in some outlying districts, such as the Hebrides.)

There is already enough antagonism between cultures without exacerbating it even more by bringing disparate elements together. Even in America— and by this term I mean what some refer to as "The Americas"— where there is far more tolerance than in Europe (how could it be otherwise with such a motley influx of races?) there has so far not been a thorough fusion of the diverse ethnic strands and elements, so different communities tend to stick together except for those that marry outside (frequently ostracised by their own), or unless there exist many common customs and traits, such as between Spanish and Italians— though even here the mixture can be less smooth than one might anticipate. Nevertheless, there is a gradual process of amalgamation going on which, we must suppose, one day will reach perfection.

And then there is the matter of democratic values. Democracy: that rare, beleaguered flower in the world. In Europe it exists in but few countries. France and Britain have a reasonably democratic outlook, their citizens being jealous of their personal freedoms (some of them) and on occasion those of others,which is most heart-warming when it does occur, even if their state institutions do somewhat lag behind, as might be expected. All this is indeed important because it results in natural indignation at tyrannical behaviour, and may even lead to practical action against it, as in both World Wars. At least it defines the camps, so that it is somehow logical and reasonable for Britain and France to be allies, different though they are in so many other respects. (The wartime alliance with Russia, which seems despotic through-and-through, was political and military rather than a consequence of outlooks and feelings. Let us not forget that Russia, even more than Germany, possessed a thoroughly feudal aristocratic system until the beginning of the 20th century. If it was not always oppressive, it still did not allow a great deal of social mobility and personal freedom, nor even less encourage it. Feudalism is unfortunately still very much with us, and on the increase, if anything. In the case of Britain's favouring Turkey during the Victorian era— the queen herself being quite instrumental in this respect— it can only be understood as an alliance of convenience against Russia, for if any two countries are like chalk and cheese, they are Britain and Turkey.)

Turkey seems unlikely to embrace democracy within the visible future, if ever. It just does not run in their veins, despite the fact that everywhere in the world the individual always yearns for freedom. What Turkey will do, no doubt, is make an outward display consisting in never-to-be-fulfilled promises, as so often in the past, of its liberal, democratic intentions. Has this altered? Of course not: it is necessary to learn from history, until it remains proven that change has truly occured. This may sound pessimistic, but changes depend on the general outlook, and this is most difficult to modify. People live according to what they believe and are used to, and it would be naive to expect this to suddenly go away after century-long tradition. You cannot so easily rid the leopard of his spots.

So, in sum, the factors operating against Turkey are: (1) differences of "religion," (giving rise to different and probably irreconcilable cultures); (2) Turkey is not European, never mind how much it has messed around in Europe in the past; and (3) it is thoroughly undemocratic.

What the third factor, which is by far the most important— possibly the only really vital one— signifies is an unlikelihood to "progress." We should not become unduly enamoured with this word, since it has also been a handle used to carry out many a dastardly deed. Nevertheless it is useful if properly understood. Despotism absolutely precludes a progressive outlook. This is not always understood, especially nowadays when money (shall we call it "investment?") is so often regarded as THE trigger of progress. This is to confuse cause and effect— and it is how we have had so many inoportune experiences with "swallow" capitals, a term much clearer than the Spanish "golondrina," which only partially renders the underlying meaning, missing out the pun: not so much the migratory bird but the action. Where did the term originate? let us ask some attentive philologist. If in Spanish, then we must assume some kind of Freudian hit. If in English, we should be extremely wary.

Reality is rather more subtle than "investments," as any rags-to-riches story attests. But many are blinded by appearances. Anyhow, most people do not wish to change, thinking progress (by which they understand "economic growth") can exist even without setting up the right conditions for it. How can the principle be put more clearly, without going too far astray in this rather complex subject? Despotism, being conservative, is essentially against progress because it seeks to keep things unchanged, and concentrate all power in its own hands. For progress to occur, a wide power-base is required, in which prime quality universal education always plays a significant role.

Thus the present Armenian tendency to seize Turkey's wish to join the EU as a means of forcing a much-belated recognition of the genocide seems politically unsound: Turkey should not be incorporated either way. At least for now, meaning, until attitudes and practices change in a totally unequivocal way. Recognition is something that must come about at some point, the Genocide being an incontrovertible historical fact, so that negation, plus any state system based thereon, is not only hypocritical but quite simply schizophrenic, as Taner Akçam points out. Turkey is embarked on a quite deliberate multi-million-dollar propaganda campaign of promoting its implausible, untenable theses. One just wonders how they have the face to go on denying the misdeeds of their past when the whole world can see they are lying. Of course, recognition will be painful, for they will have to admit their untruthfulness, besides the actual villanies. But the opposite only makes the matter more tangled, and so puts in question whether Turkey can be taken seriously on an international level, even admitting there are few countries that can. Grim, yes— plenty; but serious, not too many.

Never mind how much Armenians yearn for recognition (yet would they be content merely with a pro forma admission of guilt, or would they go for some kind of reparation, territorial and/or other, which would seem more in order?) at this moment they are mixing up the issues. Turkey's acceptance or not into the European Union has nothing whatever to do with recognizing a Genocide it most certainly did commit, except to indicate a certain unsavouriness, in which case why admit it? The intrinsic contradiction in this is evident: "We're nasty guys. So, let us in." To use such a condition as pressure is somewhat akin to blackmail, or holding out a carrot, with the big disadvantage of implying that, once Turkey does own up, its entry into the EU is assured. That being a condition, would Turkey not feel diddled and rightly infuriated if rejected? The more proper course might be to expect acknowledgment on grounds of Truth and Justice, and international harmony and tolerance. But maybe that is too naive: not everyone believes in these or cares about them. So a legitimate and possibly very useful angle might be the question of seriousness: can Turkey be taken seriously in the concert of nations? Does it mind, though? Apparently not too much. And how much would the average Turk, who is generally entirely out of the picture, be aware of this? Muddling through is the way nations function in most cases, and it seems to work just well enough until things radically collapse.

All very complicated.

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Related Considerations

Perhaps there are one or two additional observations to be made in order to keep the record straight. In the first place, the European Union is not really a union in the same sense as, say, the United States, but more of the nature of an economic community (as it was previously called), a sort of modern-day Zollverein, such as operated in patchwork Germany before its unification. It may be that the tendency is towards a gradual unification of nations, (with notable exceptions like the Balkans, where ancient animosities seem to rage on as ever, imparting centrifugal impetus); but it could also result in the establishment of a handful of giant camps, mutually hostile and exclusive, some of them frankly imperialistic, and far more sinister than anything Orwell (who just got the date a bit wrong), or Hitler, dreamt up. The European Union still has no common citizenship and, from what I have experienced, there is no spirit of unity in Europe, unlike America, where a century-long process of integration has brought about a certain degree of union, or at least mutual tolerance. Or it may just be that America has a headstart on Europe. One would like to think the Benelux group, which later blossomed into the six of the EEC and then to the present monster, was based on democratic rather than economic thinking. Perhaps it was (I am uninformed about this), yet Europe in general seems far more intolerant and oppressive in its thought and feeling than a genuine democratic basis would warrant. Of course the individual citizen yearns for autonomy as in any part of the world, but the impression I got when I lived there is that hardly anyone can stand anyone else, whether foreigner or compatriot. (This was confirmed by a local Armenian who, unprompted, offered the very same opinion, while at the same time praising Argentine tolerance and inclusiveness.)

I have ever had a semi-anarchistic bias (of the moderate kind), and believe true democracy consists in extreme, utter individual autonomy. I was born, and live, in a fairly anarchistic country, Argentina, where the results have admittedly not always been happy. Yet visitors find it refreshing to be in a place where you do not have laws and officials breathing down your neck all the time, and obviously this is the way the locals prefer it. Needless to say, it has not led to the organization or untold prosperity Argentines ostensibly believe in; yet, since the results are different, one must suspect the true underlying philosophy, or rather gut-feeling, goes in a different direction. Since social and political evolution has always consisted in the individual being pitted against all encroachments on his liberty by the state, so that there are in reality two, and only two, possible political parties— the government and the governed— and, because each person is an individual himself, no matter which party he belongs to, the final aim of that evolution must be total freedom and autonomy of the individual. That that aim has not yet been achieved is self-evident, though some societies are decidedly closer to it than others.

In his essay, "The Determinants of the Armenian Genocide," genocide scholar Vahakn N. Dadrian offers an interesting insight in comparing the Young Turks and the Nazis (who have a number of common features). Indeed it could be extended to a good many other tyrannical regimes. He speaks of "formal and informal authority." The first presupposes a strong state, managed by a government and bureacracy that adhere strictly to the established rules. The second presupposes a weak state in which a certain group, not to call it a mafia, takes power by means licit or illicit— often of the latter variety— and manages the state according for its own benefit behind a façade of legality. Thus the state turns into a mere tool to carry out the aims of that group within it, which are almost by definition inimical to the interests of the individual and, so, the state itself.

There is an apparent contradiction here. Freedom is in inverse ratio to the prevalence of rules. So it would seem a weak state is necessary for freedom to exist. But weak states easily lead to tyranny. The key lies in differentiating weak (ineffective) and strong but unobtrusive, as spoken of more than once in the Tao Te Ching, e.g. xvii: "The best of all rulers is but a shadowy presence to his subjects," or xxix: "The empire is a sacred vessel and nothing should be done to it,"— embodying the Principle of Non-Action, that is, non-busywork, unmeddlesomeness. When will we learn from such wisdom?

I acknowledge I have visited neither Turkey nor Russia, but have read fairly extensively, in relation to the Armenian genocide and otherwise. There are some that speak of the "good Turks." One, "Kampf ums Überleben: Franz Werfel und die Armenier vom Musa Dagh" by Hannes Stein (in Huberta von Voss, ed., Porträt einer Hoffnung: Die Armenier), relates his visit to Musa Dagh, during which he meets and is shown hospitality by Turks, and wonders how these seemingly harmless people with their "moustaches and gentle brown eyes" could ever commit genocide. A similar remark is made by Marina Palmer in her Kiss and Tango about the Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, and the Argentine military dictatorship of 1976-83. "Everyone here seems so cheerful," she writes. "It's impossible to imagine these people oppressing anybody— and frankly, I'd rather not."

The two cases are similar, but not identical, and without doubt far more complex than they appear on the surface. The remark about Argentines is justified: the average citizen is often remarkably kind. Yet there existed a very vicious subversive movement, ruthlessly repressed by a right-wing military dictatorship, in which many abuses were committed on both sides. This junta ruled the country by means of the "informal authority" Dadrian mentions. The average citizen was not only impotent to do anything about it, but in fact knew practically nothing of what was going on. There were rumours, of course, but it was all covered up pretty tidily. It also so happens that, alongside a kind, humane population, there exist veritable hellhounds. They are still around.

In the case of Turkey, it is worth considering who the individual perpetrators actually were. Without doubt there were people opposed to the nasty goings on (such as general Mehmet Vehip pashá, Naím Sefá bey, Mevlán zadé Rifat, and others— "scant exceptions," says Dadrian), yet the general population seems to have been all for it. The dirty work was carried out by "chetés," who were bands of criminals released from the country's jails expressly for the purpose, and incorporated into the "Special Organization" (Teshkilati Mahsusa). There were also Kurds, organized as "hamidís," that is, regiments of tribal horsemen created by sultan Abdul Hamid II in order to carry out the massacres of 300.000 Armenians in 1894-96. These mounted groups again came into action in 1915, and participated in liquidating pretty much the whole of the Armenian population, by killing between 1 and 1.5 million of them by direct massacre or the death marches, and driving the rest (of the 2.4 million) into exile. The military and gendarmerie also took part, on orders of the central Young Turk government.

However, it was not only governmental forces that carried out the butchery: a large part of the general population, including the peasants, gleefully joined in— in the wartime Genocide, and in the post-war massacres, such as at Marash, Zeitun, and elsewhere (Stanley E. Kerr, The Lions of Marash). Very likely they were often misled by government propaganda, or that of the Kemalist nationalist rebels after the war, but the fact remains that the bulk of the Turkish population undertook its gory mission without the slightest qualms or hesitation. No— with enthusiasm.

One can appreciate the Turkish point of view, which saw the Armenians as yet another factor, and a central one, in the Ottoman Empire's breakup. In opposition to this, it must be said that the Armenians settled in Asia Minor long before the Turks, who later conquered them and treated them as second-class citizens (milleti mahkume), after despotic Oriental fashion. The Armenians also became unwitting but ready pawns in an imperialistic European power-game, and paid a huge price for it (being unsurpassable proof of just how dangerous idle meddling by outsiders can be).

In a nutshell: the Armenians wanted a) an independent state of their own; and b) Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité. It is obvious this could only be achieved at the expense of what the Turks considered their territory, and of Turkish despotism, which was theirs without question.

How is it that the average mild citizen can suddenly turn into a murderous, ravening beast? This happened in Turkey and Germany, in the latter not only during the National-Socialist era, but also before and during the First World War. The same was so in the Russian, Ukrainian, Latvian, Polish pogroms, and many other instances besides. This is a complex matter, and has to do with mob psychology: mass hysteria, psychopathy, paranoia— all these come into it, as well as prejudices induced by fanatical, fundamentalist religions. The Orthodox church was to blame for a good deal of antisemitic feeling and consequent pogroms in Russia (see Robert Massey, Nicholas and Alexandra). What it means is that the individual with his "moustache and gentle brown eyes," now carried away by the group around him, driven by fear and hate, suddenly loses sight of who he is (to an even greater degree than is usually the case, see Eckhart Tolle, The Power of Now), and goes literally mad: that is, he loses conscience of reality, thinking he is someone, somewhere, some time else than he actually is, which is as good a definition of madness as any. Unless there is an organic dysfunction involved, insanity is based exclusively on belief, either personal or general. If personal, then only that individual will be out of touch; if general, then it is the society itself that is mad. The belief-system of a society is immensely powerful, and terribly difficult to modify, in the same way that individual madness is so resistant to cure. So long as individuals are immersed in a particular society, they will usually be subject to its psychological influences, some more, others less, depending on the distance from reality of their personal and communal belief-systems, and the presence or absence of an objective yardstick. Moving into another society, either by emigration, or by foreign travel, many are suddenly able to see things ever so much more clearly, having a point of reference with which to compare the new experience with the old... until the novelty wears off, and ennui sets in once more. This is why travel (or other experiences allowing comparison) can often be so liberating.

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In conclusion, of the three main reasons for keeping Turkey out of the European Union, the least telling is their East Asian provenance. So what? They are fairly mixed anyway. This would not be an impediment.

The religious differences would not be important, were it not that Islam does seem to bring out the wolf in its adherents more than other religions. As a matter of fact all Middle Eastern religions are based on the idea of the omnipotent tyrant and, where this is taken seriously, leads to a corresponding general political outlook. (What other outlooks are possible? The aim of Indian religion is to enable the individual to realize he is God. Chinese Taoist religion— or philosophy, if one prefers— is relational, based on harmony between the individual and his environment, between one and the world, in short.) In fact, any kind of religion based on despotism, if followed consistently, must needs give rise to a despotic political model.

Not only Turks are despots. There are a good number of Europeans of diverse origins who also have this non-egalitarian, undemocratic turn of mind. So which comes first: the religion or the politics? Perhaps it is the general attitude to life that sets its imprint on both. Anyhow, what difference does it make? What is important is the result.